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Commentary on John Deely: 
Ethics and the Semiosis-Semiotics Distinction
Gerald Ostdiek, Charles University Prague
In questions of the truth-value of various ethical considerations, semiotics 
is rightly playing an enlarged role. John Deely’s recent approach is to draw 
a potentially untenable distinction between semiosis and semiotics, and to 
assign ethics to the province of the later. This semiotic rendering of the 
NOMA1 principle offers both possibilities and problems: following the prin-
ciple of falsification, this commentary focuses on the later so that we may 
better access the former.
Deely articulates his discussion of ethics “backwards” – a most com-
mendable choice. While ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ become absurd when taken as 
absolutes, ‘more clear and distinct’ can be distinguished from ‘less clear 
and distinct’. He rightly dismisses the notion that ethical behavior on our 
part is grounded in human feelings of empathy and respect for maternal 
devotion or the enduring of pain on the part of the non-human. He contrasts 
this muddled romanticism with a semiotically defined notion of responsibi-
lity, which “applies only to a being capable (whether it actually does so or 
not) of looking beyond its own boundaries” s o  a s  t o  “reckon with the 
larger picture of the biosphere sustained within a framework of relations 
that perception alone cannot reveal”. This sets the stage for Deely’s larger 
arguments: it also limits ethics to a subset of species-specific epistemolo-
gy. Here I focus this review. 
Deely’s articulation of semiotic ethics begins with the most basic onto-
genetic agreement (there exists a single shared physical world, within which 
there exists evolving things). From this, Deely patiently constructs a view 
of existence wherein biotic/semiosic subjectivity generates consequence 
(i.e., is generative of what-is), but not ethical considerations, which he sees 
as limited to s e m i o t i c  behavior. In so doing, Deely builds on several 
strands of Biosemiotic argumentation: that life is co-extensive with sign use 
as well as the consequent existence of subjectivity, that the subjective is 
necessarily intersubjective, and that all this is entailed by how living things 
(multifariously) go about the business of living (i.e. find, or avoid, what they 
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must so as to go on living). The argument is that: “the ‘colors seen’ result 
from the subjective constitution on both sides of the interaction, not simply 
on one side or the other”. Deely furthers this by arguing that while intersub-
jectivity is the common norm of life, transsubjectivity – which is co-extensi-
ve with metasemiosis (or, semiotics), is a rare (human specific) exaptation, 
entailed by (human) culture and entailing a relationship of ethics, episte-
mology, and responsibility:
Ethical behavior is not “doing what you are told”; ethical behavior is acting respon-
sibly in whatever circumstances you find yourself. And seeing the difference bet-
ween being responsible and being skillful is what metasemiosis – semiotics –  alone 
makes possible, and this only in the world of human culture.
Yet it is not just a question of relationships: all sign use is relational. (Moreo-
ver, relatedness is the stuff of all being, while the generation of actual rela-
tions o u t  o f  m e r e  p o s s i b i l i t y  is the stuff of life.) Rather, semiotics 
(as Deely uses the term) is a specificity of relating made possible by semi-
osis that transcends it by taking on novel function. It is a specific form of 
sign use that generates meaning not in relation to physical (or physically 
perceivable) phenomena, but from some heritage of usage within (human) 
culture (i.e., Peirce’s legisigns). Deely defines this distinction as a semio-
sic/semiotic divide, and argues that the concept of ethics exists only on the 
later (and rarer) side of things. While all living things are semiosic, few are 
semiotic:
The answer to Morten [Tønnessen]’s question about recognizing signs as signs, in 
its bearing upon ethics, depends upon the animal’s ability or inability to deal with 
relations in their own right as distinct from, even though dependent upon, related 
objects and things. Because once you have realized that what makes a sign a sign 
is always a relation, and that no relation can be directly instantiated to perception, 
you have reached the point where human understanding goes beyond animal esti-
mation.
It is not entirely clear whether or not Deely sees this divide as ‘hard’ – one 
of k i n d , or ‘soft’ – one of d e g r e e . I am reminded of Chauncey Wright’s 
classic argument that all animals (I would say all living things) are a w a r e 
(function semiosically), and that self-awareness is a matter of d e g r e e  of 
awareness and not of a different kind of awareness, but that difference in 
degree c a n  generate difference in kind o f  c o n s e q u e n c e . Deely is 
clearly not unaware of this argument, as he plays it evocatively, but does 
seem uninterested in resolving it. This leaves room for others to use his 
work not just in furthering our understanding of the supposed semiosic/
semiotic divide, but in bridging it within a larger biosemiotic framework – 
and thereby clarifying questions of ethical behavior, the role of signs in the 
evolution of ethical norms, and the role ethics has played in the evolution 
of self-consciousness (and more). These are just a few of the issues wai-
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ting to be resolved which would rightfully feature Deely’s Ethics and the 
Semiosis-Semiotics distinction.
By my read, the center of Deely’s semioethics can be found at the inter-
section of the two block quotes pasted above. I offer several criticisms inten-
ded to further Deely’s semioethic considerations:
As stated above, Deely argues that while semiosic experience is ubiqui-
tous to life, responsibility for choices made possible by semiosis – both indi-
vidual and collective along with all that it entails (summarized as ethics) – 
is uniquely human and properly tied to the ability to see (that is, to know) 
signs a s  signs: i.e., semiotics. On this point I argue that can be no hard 
divide: human and not, the attentions of a living thing t e n d  to rush from 
sign to thing signified. Humanity, no doubt, evolved so as to b e t t e r  noti-
ce signs as signs: it is our species specific knack – but the fact that cheetahs 
run faster than all other land animals does not mean that no other animal 
can run. I argue that a solid grasp of the softness of the distinction may be 
highly useful (i.e., true).2 This may help us better understand the intersec-
tion human and non-human behavior (and resolve some of the many pres-
sing issues of anthropomorphic ecological damage). Do wild predators who 
develop a particular taste for human flesh act out of vengeance – i.e., irre-
sponsibly? And do ‘civilized’ humans who behave ‘barbarically’ do so out of 
their inherent animality – i.e., failure to see signs as signs? These distinc-
tions are less clear to me than they seem to be for Deely. 
In positing his epistemologically derived, species-specific notion of ethics, 
Deely argues: “Responsibility is an extension of speculative understanding, 
just as practical knowledge is an extension of speculative knowledge.” This 
is a powerful claim but it lacks clarity and is, perhaps, empirically falsifiab-
le. What Deely means by contrasting ‘understanding’ with ‘knowledge’ this 
article does not make clear. Moreover, within human culture practical kno-
wing commonly comes to be sans the context of relevant speculative know-
ledge. That the physics of the day denied the existence of a vacuum did not 
stop the development of the suction pump. Bog iron was smelted and worked 
centuries before any speculative knowledge of biochemical oxidation occur-
red. In the process of science, practical knowing often precedes theoreti-
cal knowing (abductive inference, which is also vital to science, is an excep-
tion to this rule). Contra Deely, I argue pragmatically: speculative and/or 
theoretical knowing (plus all entailments) is abstracted a posteriori, and 
consists of a furthering of practical knowing/understanding. 
Within non-human cultures, Deely’s distinction is even less clear. Even 
if birds ‘know’ to build their nests only p r a c t i c a l l y, might their ability to 
generate novel possibility (by nesting) at least imply potential speculation? 
Is this a practical ‘knowing’ that lacks ‘understanding’? Or is it vice versa? 
Might not the bird have some ‘understanding’ that what it does is related to 
the business of procreation? Is t h i s  ‘understanding’ practical but not kno-
wing? As species migrate in response to climate change, we can agree that 
they have extremely little or even absolutely no ‘speculative’ (theoretical) 
knowledge of anthropomorphic causes. But climbing temperatures does 
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render their former range less habitable (for them). Is their change of beha-
vior simply a practical response to a felt but not understood, umwelt speci-
fic ‘instinct’? If so, what is t h a t ? How is “animal estimation” not praxis sans 
gnosis? And if it is, doesn’t this argue against Deely? Again, these distinc-
tions are less clear to me than they seem to be to Deely. 
Moving on, Deely argues that the key to ethics is culture – not in a bio-
logical sense, nor in a ‘postmodern’ sense of ethical ‘relativity’ wherein the 
ethical is whatever some culture says it is, but in a rather strict sense of the 
post-biotic living thing (my words3) – i.e., the ‘life’ of symbols, cities, and 
notional ‘selves’ (etcetera), as measured by success/survival/thriving of the 
thing. For Deely, semiotics comes into play only with the “establishment of 
culture within an otherwise animal society” and functions only within such 
a culture. ‘Culture’ in this sense functions by taking on aspects that not only 
mimic biotic things, is not only analogous to biotic things, but functions as 
biotic things function. This is a most useful (true) argument, and I look for-
ward to seeing it furthered by study into the nature of culture and the life of 
post-biotic biosemiotic phenomena (i.e., the intersection of biology and 
humanities).
Finally, in this article, Deely appears to contradict a distinction made his 
1990 Basics of semiotics, which clearly states that semiotics is the study 
of semiosis, with semiosis being a “private to you” functioning of signs that 
remains inaccessible even to the semiosic individual experiencing them – 
except at a remove, through a distant but contiguous study of signs (or, 
semiotics). In so doing, he ties semioethics to Sebeok’s use of umwelt and 
innenwelt: It strikes me that he leaves much ground to be covered in this 
regard. I argue that the terms are often interchangeable, and the second is 
largely meaningless. Clearly every innenwelt is necessarily an umwelt (as 
organisms are also ecosystems), though not every umwelt is an innenwelt 
(there are phenomena to which the concept life – along with all that it entails: 
not only semiotics, but also semiosis – has no useful application). To speak 
as though there is a clear distinction between umwelt and innenwelt is to 
use the scale of the multi-cellular organism as the base-line of life, and to 
claim exceptionality for ‘our’ scale of life – that of the (at least potentially) 
self-reflective organism. While this claim is itself irrational, it is not irratio-
nal to further the notion by claiming (as per Deely) that reflexivity (esp. in 
the sense of Mead) and all that it entails is the ground of ethics. That Deely 
largely ignores the scale-thick4 quality of life to focus on the level of the 
organism and the human experience thereof does not invalidate his argu-
ment (all science, indeed all knowing, necessarily involves focus – the fact 
that there exists phenomena beyond some given aperture does not neces-
sarily invalidate claims made within it). It does, however, leave to others the 
work of furthering his notions (often via counter-punctuation) vis-à-vis ques-
tions of larger universality (i.e., usefulness across multiple scales of life) as 
well as whatever larger epistemic/ethic relationship is therein entailed.
And yet, if (as Tønnessen questions5 and Wright argues6) alloanimals 
are (at least somewhat or even just potentially) capable of noticing signs 
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as signs (the hallmark of reflexivity as understood from a semiotic perspec-
tive), then the concept of semioethics is necessarily larger than Deely arti-
culates. The difficulty in establishing regularity in interpretation is well esta-
blished (as a necessary consequence of the transformative nature of semi-
osic function), but legisign function (which occupies most of Deely’s focus) 
necessarily exacerbates this. It turns the attempt to know what s e l f -
r e f l e c t i v e  life knows into a metaphysic of narration for symbols (as well 
as symbolically derived psychologies, social sites, cultures, etc.) evolve: as 
the conventions of a given community experience their own evolutionary 
pressures, they write their own stories.7 Though alloanimals may well (and 
certainly appear to) be less capable of noticing signs as signs, and are thus 
less affected by legisign function than human animals, do we not remain 
ethically obligated to allow them their stories (conventions, etc.), such as 
they are? And does this not render Deely’s distinction ethically questiona-
ble?
This problem is not merely exacerbated, but compounded by several 
orders of magnitude if (as I argue) life is scale thick such that meaning is 
oft generated as consequence crosses multiple scales of life (e.g., endo- 
exo- and eco-) to entangle scale-specific differences of semiotic function 
within a heterarchy capable of defying binary distinctions as handily as 
ready sorting.8 
As with all evolutionary phenomena, the usefulness (truth) of Deely’s 
coupling of ethics with a semiosic-semiotic divide can be measured only 
by success in furthering (by the ‘life’ of) the generalization as it is transfor-
med by encountered (perceived) specificities. Indeed, “from so simple a 
beginning endless forms [biotic, semiosic, and semiotic] most beautiful and 
most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.” Deely understands 
this, and my intent in this commentary has been to point towards avenues 
by which Deely’s concepts may be successfully challenged – and thereby 
furthered. 
Notes
1 Gould (1997): NOMA stands for Non-overlapping Magisteria.
2 Here I presume upon the Pragmatic notion that ‘truth’ has not two, but three cri-
teria: coherence, correspondence, and use. Re: Chauncey Wright “A theory which 
is utilized receives the highest possible certificate of truth”: Wright (2000: 51).
3 Re: Ostdiek (2016).
4 Havel (1996): a phenomenon is scale thick if it is meaningful and/or consequen-
tial on more than a single natural scale. A ‘scale’ is differentiated when some dif-
ferent set of markers (methods or measurements) becomes necessary to distin-
guish a particular phenomenon discovered therein.
5 As referenced by Deely and quoted above.
6 Wright (2000: 199) and Madden (1963: 128): Wright’s Evolution of Self-Conscious-
ness is structured on the proposition that animals are (at least potentially) capa-
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ble of recognizing signs as signs. Madden’s Metaphysics of Self-Consciousness 
details its entailment within Wright’s work and through his influence on others, 
particularly in the logical structure of the psychologies of James and Dewey. I will 
add that Peirce’s doctrine of synechism blatantly posits that there can be no hard 
semiosic semiotic distinction.
7 On the life of symbols and its consequence, see Nöth (2013), and Ostdiek (2016).
8 See the special issue on multi-level semiosis in the journal Biosemiotics (2016).
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